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Strategic Implications of Phobos as a Staging Point for 
Mars Surface Missions 
Abstract— As human exploration endeavors begin to set sights beyond low Earth orbit to the surface of the Moon, exploration 
of the surface of Mars continues to serve as the “horizon destination” to help focus development and research efforts.  One 
Mars exploration strategy often discussed is the notion of utilizing the moons of Mars, namely Phobos, as an exploration 
destination prior to Mars surface missions. The premise behind this is that staging missions from Mars’ moons as well as 
exploring the moons themselves would be less costly and risky. However, understanding potential advantages of Phobos staging 
and exploration must be done in the context of the overall end-to-end Mars surface exploration needs, goals, objectives, 
campaign approach, and systems required.  This paper examines the strategic implications of utilizing the moons of Mars as a 
potential location for exploration of Mars. Operational concepts utilizing both Phobos and Mars orbital strategies will be 
examined to understand the architectural impacts of this staging strategy. The strategic implications of each operational concept 
are assessed to determine the overall key challenges and strategic links to other exploration destinations.  Results from this 
analysis indicate that, if the objective is to conduct Mars surface missions, utilizing Phobos as an exploration destination adds 
little benefit toward the goal of exploration of Mars. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The President’s Space Policy Directive-1 [1] provides the 
direction for NASA to more effectively organize 
government, commercial and international efforts to develop 
a sustainable presence on the Moon and beyond. Human 
exploration of the Moon is part of a larger, sustainable 
exploration campaign extending from low-Earth orbit to the 
surface of Mars, and deeper into space.  In addition, human 
exploration of Mars has continued to foster strong bipartisan 
congressional support with the NASA Authorization Act of 
2008 [2] and the NASA Authorization Transition Act of 2017 
[3] which specifically call for human missions to the surface
of Mars as the horizon goal to focus NASA’s exploration
development efforts.
While exploration of the surface of Mars has maintained 
strong support throughout the modern era of human 
exploration planning, missions to the moons of Mars, Phobos 
and Deimos, have at times also been injected into strategic 
planning discussions [4-20], often because Phobos and 
Deimos are presumed to be a “cheap and easy” first step to 
Mars exploration. Assessments of conducting human 
exploration of the moons of Mars have ranged from full up 
architecture and system concept definition to others which 
are more pedestrian, only providing casual mention of the 
potential strategic value of Mars moon exploration.  
Comprised within many of these studies are stated underlying 
rationales and motivations for human exploration of Phobos 
and Deimos.  Typical rationales include the assertion that 
human missions to Phobos and/or Deimos would:  
• serve as a catalyst for future human exploration;
• be easy missions to conduct because they side-step the
need for a Mars lander or ascent vehicle;
• function as a platform for low-latency telerobotic
exploration of Mars;
• help certify human exploration systems;
• serve as a staging point for surface missions;
• represent a low-cost entry point for exploration of Mars;
and
• ease the transportation burden through in-situ
propellant production.
When formulating exploration concepts, it is important to 
view the entire exploration campaign to understand how each 
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progressive step, vehicle element, and operational construct 
fits within the entire system-of-systems architectural 
strategy.  That is, missions to Phobos should not be viewed 
independently as standalone endeavors, but rather should be 
viewed from the perspective of how they advance the overall 
exploration goals.  As discussed earlier, human exploration 
of the surface of Mars has retained strong and lasting 
consensus as a national goal and thus should comprise a 
strong focus of the exploration efforts.  Therefore, missions 
which may precede Mars surface missions should be assessed 
in how well they advance that overarching goal.  More 
specifically, if a human mission to Phobos and/or Deimos 
were conducted prior to a Mars surface mission, the question 
of how well it feeds forward to the goal of humans on Mars 
should be a key consideration. 
This paper will examine the strategic implications of human 
exploration missions to the moons of Mars, Phobos1 and 
Deimos, as potential destinations on the way to the surface of 
Mars.  This discussion will begin with a brief discussion of 
the moons’ characteristics followed by an overview of 
example exploration strategies of the martian system.  That 
discussion will include a range of Phobos exploration 
concepts as well as exploration of the surface of Mars.  These 
mission approaches are discussed to provide context for the 
rationales of human exploration of Phobos.  
2. THE MOONS OF MARS: PHOBOS AND
DEIMOS
The origin of Phobos and Deimos continues to be highly 
debated with theories ranging from these bodies being 
captured asteroids to the idea that they could have coalesced 
from debris still in orbit after Mars formed, or perhaps that 
Mars was once surrounded by many Phobos and Deimos-
sized bodies during its formation, with only these two 
remaining today [21].  Spectroscopically both Phobos and 
Deimos appear to be similar to C or D-type asteroids 
(carbonaceous chondrite). The moons are shaped like 
ellipsoids and are tidally locked with Mars, keeping one face 
toward the planet. Since Phobos is at a location of very strong 
tidal forces (inside Roche’s limit) it will either disintegrate 
into a ring or crash into Mars in about 100 million years. The 
surface of Phobos is cratered (indicating it is greater than 3 
billion years old) and scored by deep linear groves like those 
seen on Vesta that point along its orbital motion.  Deimos has 
a smoother surface, perhaps indicating extensive regolith. 
The densities of these moons are too low to be solid rock with 
porosities of 20 to 30% (supporting the non-asteroid origin) 
and both bodies have very low surface gravity (measured in 
thousandths of a g).  Observations are consistent with both 
moons being rubble piles.  There is a significant range in the 
size of material on their surface and there has been 
speculation of dust rings circling both bodies, but the rings 
have never been observed.  Both satellites are in nearly 
circular orbits almost exactly in Mars’ equatorial plane.  
These orbital characteristics are important factors since those 
1 Within this text the term Phobos is often used in a singular generic sense 
to refer to the moons of Mars, both Phobos and Deimos, and is not meant to 
orbits will drive the overall transportation and system 
architecture as discussed further in Section 3.  Figure 1 
provides some basic characteristics of Phobos and Deimos.  
3. EXPLORING THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF
MARS
Round-trip missions to Mars, either to the surface or to the 
moons of Mars, will require a series of complex maneuvers. 
As shown in Figure 2, round-trip Mars missions are typically 
conducted in four phases comprised of: 1) uncrewed 
operations of launch and assembly of the transportation 
vehicles including pre-deployment of mission assets (denoted 
blue), 2) transfer of crew from Earth to Mars orbit (denoted 
green), 3) exploration of Mars (Phobos option denoted gray 
and Mars surface denoted orange), and 4) return of the crew 
back to Earth (again denoted green).  While the entire Mars 
operational sequence is important, this paper will focus 
predominately on the options for exploring the neighborhood 
of Mars, namely the surface of Mars, with an understanding 
of how Phobos may fit into that campaign strategy. 
Pre-Deployment of Mission Assets 
Previous Mars architecture assessments have shown that the 
mission approach of pre-deploying cargo ahead of the crew 
is an advantageous strategy (Drake [22], Craig [15, 16]).  
With this “forward deploy” strategy a portion of each 
mission’s assets would be sent to the vicinity of Mars prior to 
the crew.  While this forward deploy strategy adds additional 
operational time to some of the systems, it provides some 
unique advantages over the strategy where all the necessary 
assets are transported with the crew.  That is, this strategy 
would: 
Figure 1. Key characteristics of Phobos and Deimos. 
exclude potential mission to Deimos as well 
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• allow for verification and checkout of many of the Mars 
systems prior to departure of the crew from Earth, thus 
reducing crew and mission risk; 
• result in lower overall mission mass by allowing cargo 
to be transported on lower energy trajectories;  
• facilitate advanced operational strategies such as the 
generation of ascent propellants prior to committing the 
crew to the surface; and  
• allow the crew to fly on faster, higher-energy 
trajectories, thus minimizing their exposure to the 
hazards associated with deep-space inter-planetary 
travel. 
For the mission and systems concepts considered within the 
assessments for this paper, the pre-deploy strategy is assumed 
for all mission concepts.  The specific systems which are pre-
deployed are dependent on the capabilities required for the 
destination and operational concept as described in the 
following sections. 
Transportation of Crew to Mars Orbit 
As depicted in Figure 2, for any round-trip mission to Mars a 
series of maneuvers are required for both the arrival and 
departure of the crew vehicle.  Qu, et al [23] provides an 
excellent overview of some of the considerations for 
optimization of the parking orbits for Mars missions.  From 
this study, as well as others, it has been shown that an 
optimum strategy for human Mars missions is to capture the 
crew vehicle into a highly elliptical parking orbit high in the 
gravity well at Mars.  This high parking orbit, combined with 
the forward deployment strategy, provides a mass efficient 
strategy for human exploration of Mars.  This efficiency 
stems from mass optimization of the parking orbits for both 
the crew and cargo transfer vehicles which align with an 
 
Figure 2.  Typical crew Mars mission major event 
sequence. 
 
2  A 1-sol orbit has a period equal to the average length of a martian sidereal 
day of 24 hours 37 minutes 22 seconds. 
optimum split of mission functions of the various systems 
required to implement the overall exploration strategy.  In 
essence, previous studies have determined that the lower 
mass strategy is to capture the Mars transfer vehicle into a 
high-Mars orbit, typically a 1 to 5-sol orbit2 as shown in 
Figure 3.  This high-parking orbit strategy keeps the heavy 
transit vehicle and habitat high in the gravity well, thus 
reducing the total delta-v, and subsequently reducing the 
propellant required.  This “gravity well” effect can be seen in 
the mass trends illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the 
significant mass savings of keeping the Mars transit habitat 
high in the gravity well as opposed to transporting it down to 
Phobos or low-Mars orbit and back up for departure.  With 
this strategy, transportation of the crew from this high-Mars 
parking orbit to the desired exploration destination (Phobos 
or the surface of Mars) would then be conducted by smaller 
systems as described in subsequent sections. 
 
Human Exploration of Phobos  
As part of NASA’s Evolvable Mars Campaign studies in 
2016, Gernhardt, et al [18] conducted an excellent assessment 
of some of the key considerations and alternative strategies 
for the human exploration of Phobos.  For the range of 
exploration strategies considered the assessment teams 
concluded, consistent with the gravity well effect described 
above, that capturing into a high-Mars orbit with transfer of 
the crew to Phobos via a separate short duration vehicle (taxi) 
was the optimum approach.  This taxi strategy is common 
with other Phobos exploration assessments, including those 
conducted by Cichan [19] and Price [17].  With this crew to 
Phobos transfer strategy defined, exploration of Phobos can 
then be characterized by two distinct methods: “Short 
Duration” and “Long Duration Habitation”. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Orbits of various Mars staging locations. 
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Figure 4.  Example total crew vehicle mass for various 
Mars orbits. 
 
Phobos Short Duration Approach – The emphasis of this 
strategy is to minimize time spent and complexity of 
operations required to explore Phobos by incorporating a 
small taxi transfer vehicle along with the necessary “Phobos-
unique” exploration systems required to accomplish short-
duration exploration as depicted in Figure 5a.  With this 
strategy the Phobos exploration systems and taxi would be 
pre-deployed to the Mars vicinity prior to the crew leaving 
Earth.3  Once in Mars orbit the crew would use the taxi to 
transfer from high-Mars orbit to Phobos, explore the moon, 
and then return to high-Mars orbit.  This taxi must be capable 
of not only transporting the crew, but must also support the 
mission crew for the duration of exploration (typically 14-50 
days) and be capable of operation in the low gravity 
environment there.  This short stay approach is also 
consistent with the strategy proposed by Cichan [19], with the 
use of a modified Orion vehicle serving as the taxi and as the 
Phobos exploration vehicle.  It should be noted that the low-
gravity on the surface of Phobos poses some significant 
challenges which require new Phobos-unique systems.  As 
described by Cichan, “In the low gravity environment of 
Phobos and Deimos, care must be taken to avoid kicking or 
pluming the surface with thrusters as this will propel surface 
material into orbit or escape velocities.”  Thus, Phobos-
unique exploration systems and operational concepts, such as 
very low-gravity surface mobility, anchoring, and dust 
mitigation techniques, which are not needed for the eventual 
Mars surface mission, are required to properly explore this 
small body.   
Phobos Long Duration Approach – With this strategy, 
emphasis is placed on maximizing exploration of Phobos, 
including duration.  This approach is facilitated by the pre-
deployment of a long-duration habitat to Phobos prior to crew 
departure from Earth, ensuring that the necessary assets are 
in place before committing the crew to Mars orbit, as shown 
in Figure 5b.  Once in high-Mars orbit the crew would utilize 
the pre-deployed taxi to transfer from the Mars transit vehicle 
to the emplaced habitat, followed by subsequent long-
 
3  Cichan, et al suggest transporting the Orion modified vehicle (taxi) with 
the crew.  While this eliminates a pre-deployment mission, transporting the 
duration exploration.  This exploration would be further 
advanced with the incorporation of habitat mobility and 
anchoring systems to allow a range of potential sites to be 
explored during the long stay on Phobos. 
Within each of these broad operational concepts additional 
options have been considered, focusing predominately on 
how incorporation of alternative exploration systems impacts 
the overall mission complexity and mission return.  Figure 6 
provides a good overview of a range of options considered, 
including factors such as the number of short-duration 
exploration vehicles, location of the habitat, and required 
mobility and exploration systems.  The long-duration 
habitation strategy was the preferred Phobos exploration 
approach for both the Gernhardt [18] and Price [17] study 
teams. 
Human Exploration of Mars Surface 
As shown in Figure 7, human exploration of the surface of 
Mars follows similar cargo pre-deployment followed by a 
destination exploration phase.  For Mars surface missions, 
payloads are pre-deployed by dedicated landers prior to crew 
departure from Earth.  For a typical Mars surface mission, 
two landers would pre-deploy assets on the surface of Mars.  
These assets include the required power, ascent vehicle, in-
situ resource production or ascent propellants, mobility, 
habitation and logistics.  A third lander is pre-deployed to 
Mars orbit.  This vehicle serves as the crew lander, which 
 
Figure 5. Example operational concepts for human 
exploration of Phobos.
taxi with the crew will add additional mass to the crew transfer vehicle. 
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Figure 6.  Summary of Phobos exploration concepts (adapted from Gernhardt, et al). 
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not only transports the crew to the surface, but also provides 
the crew support functions necessary to readapt to a gravity 
environment after their long zero-g transfer to Mars.4  Once 
in orbit, the crew transfers to their lander, descends to the 
surface and conducts exploration of the surface of Mars.  It is 
desired to spend as much time as possible exploring, but the 
actual surface duration is typically driven by the assets which 
can be pre-deployed ahead of the crew; more assets provide 
more time to explore.  At the end of the surface mission, or 
any time during the stay in the event of an emergency, the 
crew transfers to the ascent vehicle and then to the loitering 
Mars transfer vehicle in high-Mars orbit for subsequent 
return to Earth. 
 
Figure 7.  Human exploration of Mars operational 
concept. 
4. EXAMINING THE RATIONALES FOR 
PHOBOS 
Often when exploration of Phobos is inserted into the 
discussion as a strategy for future human exploration, it is 
done from a Mars moon-centric perspective.  That is, Phobos 
exploration is considered independently and considerations 
for subsequent exploration objectives, namely exploration of 
the surface of Mars, are often neglected.  This underlying 
tone is expressed in the recent National Academies review of 
human space exploration [26]: “A crewed mission to Phobos 
and Deimos in Mars orbit would include many elements of a 
crewed mission to Mars but without the challenge of EDL 
[entry, descent and landing] and ascent from Mars.”  While 
it is true that exploration missions to Phobos or the surface of 
Mars retain many operational and system commonalities 
(specifically getting into Mars orbit and back), viewing a 
specific mission alone (e.g. Phobos) without the broader 
context of the overall strategic goals and objectives (Mars 
surface), is misleading.  Thus, it is important to understand 
the overall exploration context before judgements can be 
made as to the value of any specific stage in the exploration 
pathway.  The review of the various rationales for human 
exploration of Phobos discussed below are provided with the 
overarching context of how Phobos missions would benefit 
 
4 Other mission options, where the crew lands with a fully fueled ascent 
vehicle, have been also proposed (Price [17]) and are still under 
consideration, but have been found to require additional Mars assets 
exploration of the surface of Mars.  That is, since human 
exploration of the surface of Mars continues to retain strong 
public interest, it is assumed in the following discussion that 
Mars surface exploration should be a key element of any 
future exploration strategy. 
Low-Latency Teleoperations 
Some mission planners have proposed that one of the primary 
objectives of conducting human missions to Phobos is to 
remotely operate assets on the surface of Mars, thus 
eliminating the challenging aspects of crew landing and 
ascent from the martian surface.  This is a classic risk/return 
proposition – a claim that sufficient value can be gained 
without the risk of surface access.  However, crew landing on 
Mars cannot be ignored since it remains a key policy and 
exploration objective.  Exploration planners have typically 
viewed human exploration of Mars as being a collaboration 
of humans and robots working together.  This human-robotic 
collaboration is the core strategy of exploration today, 
whereby human operators on Earth are controlling robotic 
systems both in orbit and on the surface of Mars.  Since these 
operators control the robotic assets from the Earth, they must 
unfortunately also combat the high latency associated with 
the two-way communication delays between Earth and Mars.  
This round-trip time delay is dependent on the relative 
locations of the Earth and Mars in their respective orbits 
during the mission and can vary from 6-44 minutes round-
trip.   
As humans venture further into deep-space, the value 
proposition of the incorporation of low-latency teleoperations 
has emerged.  Low-latency operations are typically defined 
as those where the operator is near the controlled asset, so the 
communication delay is within the typical response time of 
the human operator.  This “cognitive timescale” is considered 
to be less than 0.5 seconds, but will vary depending on the 
specific task to be performed [24].  Depending on the tasks 
and response timescales required, the concept of 
“telepresence” emerges.  As described by Lupisella [24], 
telepresence “can be seen as a special case of LLT [low-
latency teleoperations] in which a remote human operator is 
more fully “present” in the environment of the asset, 
enabling highly complex and rapid decision-making for time-
critical tasks that require uniquely human judgment (e.g. 
quick science judgments for highly dynamic phenomena).  
Telepresence, with the right data, tools and low-latency, can 
facilitate a strong sense of presence at locations of interest, 
allowing rapid, complex decision-making that could be as 
effective as being there.” 
Here on Earth there are examples where teleoperations are 
showing great benefits.  For instance, remotely operated 
vehicles continue to serve as the prime enabler for complex 
operations in the deep-sea industry.  These robotic systems 
can accomplish tasks in the dangerous high-pressure deep-
(intermediate crew taxi vehicle) and larger landers.   
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sea environment with their human operator safely on board 
the support ship.  With the human operator at the helm, these 
vehicles can accomplish complex tasks and remain on station 
for long durations, extending through many daily shifts of 
their sea-top operators.  Likewise, remotely piloted aircraft 
have proven to be vital assets over the course of America’s 
operations in forward operating theaters [25].  Operation of 
these aircraft is typically accomplished with two crews: 1) the 
support crew who reside in the country where the aircraft is 
launched, landed, and maintained, and 2) a mission flight 
crew which receives “handover” after launch of the aircraft 
for the actual mission execution.  These mission control 
crews operate the vehicle via satellite signals from the 
continental United States with support from the ground team 
or traditional ground force.  It should be noted that emphasis 
in cases here on Earth, both in sea and air, the operator 
remains in a safe location while controlling the robotic asset.  
That is, risk is focused predominately on the potential loss of 
the robotic asset or unintentional collateral damage during the 
complex operations, not on the mission crew.  The crew 
remains safe, while their robotic counterpart takes the risk.  
That is not the case for Phobos missions and will be an 
important distinction discussed later. 
Some mission planners have suggested that low-latency 
teleoperations should be a prime focus of initial operations 
and exploration of Mars, specifically when missions to 
Phobos or only Mars orbit are contemplated.  With the 
astronaut near Mars, on Phobos, Deimos, or in Mars orbit, 
robotic assets could be controlled on the surface of Mars.  
Lupisella [24] provides an excellent assessment of the types 
of potential tasks that the astronaut crews could perform via 
teleoperations, including tasks such as “(1) landing and 
outpost site assessment and validation, (2) landing and 
outpost site surface preparation, (3) outpost setup and 
integration, (4) outpost operations, and (5) science 
operations, including sample acquisition and analysis as well 
as ‘crew-assisted sample return.’”  However, entry, descent, 
and landing is still required for those, often human scale, 
teleoperated assets, and thus the challenge of landing large 
payloads on Mars cannot be avoided. 
Hopkins and Pratt [13] provide an excellent discussion of the 
communication strategies for controlling surface assets from 
both Phobos and Deimos.  With these strategies, the thought 
is that the crew would remain “safe” at Phobos or Deimos 
and complex surface tasks could be conducted remotely.  
Table 1 provides an overview of some key orbital parameters, 
including approximate communication coverage for various 
locations near Mars.  Hopkins argues that due to the long 
dwell times, superior communication coverage, and solar 
illumination, Deimos offers a superior location for 
teleoperation of surface assets as compared to Phobos.  But 
examination of Table 1 shows that neither Phobos or Deimos 
provides significant advantages over high-Mars orbit from a 
communications and low-latency teleoperations perspective.  
In fact, high-Mars orbit provides latencies consistent with 
human “cognitive timescale” while providing good 
communication coverage.  High-Mars orbit also provides 
easier and lower cost (in propellant) round-trip transportation 
as well as opportunities for landing and ascent, as discussed 
later.  Regardless of the teleoperation venue, whether on 
Phobos, Deimos, or in Mars orbit, the premise that low-
latency teleoperation is a safe strategy, much like remote 
operations conducted at sea and in the air here on Earth, is 
fundamentally flawed.  The only way to achieve low latency 
for Mars is to reduce the round-trip communications time by 
placing the operator at Mars.  To do that the crew will be 
exposed to all the risks of launching, traveling to and living 
in deep-space, and returning to Earth.  The suggestion that 
accepting all of those risks for the mere purpose of reducing 
the communication lag is insufficient and cannot serve as a 
prime rationale for a human mission to Phobos. 
That is not to say that low-latency teleoperations do not play 
a role in human exploration of Mars.  On the contrary, 
mission planners have long suggested that upon arrival at 
Mars the crew will communicate with the pre-emplaced 
surface assets to ensure their operability prior to landing.  In 
addition, while on the surface, remote operations of systems 
from within the surface habitat and pressurized rovers is 
assumed to be an integral part of advanced exploration 
concepts.  This strategy is most important for hazardous 
operations, such as operating near nuclear power systems, or 
for scientific exploration such as the exploration of “special 
regions” – areas where human related contamination must be 
minimized.  Low-latency teleoperations will end up being a 
key element of future human exploration of Mars, but it 
cannot serve as a primary objective or sole operating concept 
if human surface exploration remains an important objective. 
Table 1.  Comparison of various Mars orbital 
parameters. 
 
Phobos as a Staging Point to the Surface 
As discussed in Section 2, Phobos and Deimos provide a 
stable, repeatable, predictable location deep in the gravity 
well of Mars and this distinction has motivated some mission 
planners to suggest Phobos should be used as a staging point 
for Mars surface missions.  Although this sounds like a good 
strategy, the orbits of these moons inject unique challenges 
which make them far less attractive than suggested. 
Getting to Phobos – As discussed in Section 3 and depicted 
in Figure 4, transporting mission elements, such as the crew 
habitat and landers, to Phobos will require much larger 
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transportation vehicles due to the low, circular, and equatorial 
nature of the orbit of Phobos.  Although Figure 4 shows the 
impact for the crew vehicle, similar mass impacts will occur 
for the cargo transportation systems, especially if reusability 
of those systems is desired.  Thus, utilizing Phobos as a 
staging location will place additional burden on the in-space 
transportation systems, namely increased propellant, to 
transport the mission elements deep into and out of the 
gravity well of Mars to access Phobos. 
Departing and Returning to Phobos – Here again, the circular 
nature of the orbit of Phobos poses additional challenges for 
the Mars landers and ascent vehicles for missions staged from 
that location.  Cianciolo [27] and Polsgrove [28] provide 
initial estimates of the performance characteristics of both 
Mars descent and ascent stages.  A summary of the descent 
and ascent change in velocity (delta-v) and durations are 
provided in Figure 8.  The shorter orbital period of Phobos 
(7hr 39m) will result in shorter descent and ascent times, 
which would enable smaller crew cabins for those mission 
phases.  However, since the orbit of Phobos is circular and 
nearly equatorial, the descent and landing maneuvers will 
significantly increase, especially for landing sites which are 
not located on the equator of Mars.  Figure 8 shows that the 
total descent delta-v could increase from 67%-230% for 40° 
latitude sites as compared to the high-Mars orbit case.  This 
large increase in descent delta-v would dramatically increase 
the resulting size of the landers or the corresponding decrease 
in payload which could be delivered to Mars.  It must be 
noted here that it was assumed, consistent with the analysis 
conducted by Qu [23], that the orbital parameters for both the 
low and high-Mars orbit cases could be tailored via proper 
trajectory design and timing such that these orbits could 
facilitate a co-planar descent maneuver without any needed 
plane change.  Since Phobos is in a fixed orbit which cannot 
be changed, that strategy is not possible, and thus plane 
changes must be performed during descent from Phobos for 
any non-equatorial landing sites.  These studies have also 
shown that choosing the right time for ascent as well as 
implementation of intermediate orbit phasing strategies will 
facilitate ascent from varying landing sites and thus no large 
plane change would be required during ascent.  It is 
interesting to note that with these reasonable ascent timing 
and phasing strategies, the ascent delta-v is remarkably 
similar for both high-Mars orbit and Phobos.   
Table 2 provides a comparison of some of the key mission 
characteristics for both high-Mars orbit and Phobos, showing 
a distinct advantage of high-Mars orbit staging for Mars 
surface exploration.  Therefore, Phobos should not be 
considered a staging location for future Mars surface 
missions. 
Phobos Missions as Risk Reduction 
Many strategic assessments and studies over the years have 
suggested that a human mission to Phobos can serve as a vital 
test of the round-trip transportation systems necessary for 
future human Mars missions.  That view considers the round-
trip from Earth orbit to Mars orbit, including Phobos, and 
back to be a viable risk reduction strategy prior to committing 
the crew to the descent and ascent required for Mars surface 
access.  For instance, Abercromby [14] concludes his 
assessment with the statement “Human exploration of 
Phobos offers a scientifically meaningful first step towards 
human Mars surface missions that develops and validates 
transportation, habitation, and exploration systems and 
operations in advance of the Mars landing systems.”  
Likewise, the Planetary Society [29] states that a Mars 
orbit/Phobos mission “[v]alidates method[s] for getting to 
Mars orbit and back.”  It is true that a mission to Phobos 
would facilitate the development of many of the same 
systems and operational concepts required to get to Mars 
orbit and back for a Mars surface mission.  That is, a human 
mission to Phobos requires similar round-trip transportation 
systems to get to Mars orbit and back as those required for 
Mars surface missions.  But what must be made clear from a 
vehicle certification and risk perspective is that Mars 
missions can be very unforgiving.  Shortly after leaving Earth 
orbit the ability to abort the mission and return to Earth is 
very limited and the return time is commensurate with the 
time of the declared abort, if not longer.  Free return aborts 
are typically not available and powered aborts are measured 
in durations of many months or even years.  System 
redundancy and reliability, along with strategies to mitigate 
in-flight component failures, become driving parameters in 
vehicle and system designs.  This is especially important 
since logistics supply must be well-planned, and routine 
logistics and supply delivery strategies, such as those which 
are the lifeblood of the International Space Station Program, 
are non-existent.  All the required repair and maintenance 
supplies must either be anticipated and taken with the crew, 
or pre-deployed.  Prior to committing to leaving Earth orbit, 
the mission and engineering teams must have full confidence 
in the ability of all the required systems to perform the 
mission and support the crew for the entire round-trip 
mission, nearing three-years in duration.  Thus, the human 
round-trip transportation system must be fully validated and 
certified prior to the first long-duration Mars mission, 
regardless if the target destination is Phobos, Deimos, the 
surface, or just Mars orbit.  Studies such as those done by 
Price [17] and Duggan [30] provide good examples of a 
stepwise progression of mission sequences and tests on the 
path towards Mars, including ground tests, missions in cis-
lunar space, uncrewed transportation, and landing tests.  Due 
to the lack of aborts and long-duration nature, a human 
mission to Phobos should not be viewed as a “certification 
flight” prior to subsequent Mars landing missions. 
All human missions to Mars contain within them discrete 
“go/no go” decision points which serve as risk posture gates.  
At each gate the mission support team and the crew will 
develop a consensus on whether or not the mission should 
proceed from its current mission phase (risk posture state) to 
the next.  This mission risk posture decision process will be 
much like the launch commit criteria polling that is done to 
support each launch here on Earth.  Only when all systems 
are “go” will the mission proceed further.  For human Mars 
missions there are typically five key risk posture decision 
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gates: 1) commit to launch, 2) commit to leave Earth orbit 
toward Mars (this is perhaps the most significant decision 
gate, since quick return to Earth after the trans-Mars injection 
has been completed is difficult and thus the crew must 
proceed to Mars at this point or soon after), 3) commit to 
Mars orbit insertion (a decision gate here only exists if a 
powered or free-return option has been pre-planned into the 
mission, which is rare), 4) commit to transfer to the 
exploration destination (for the discussion in this paper that 
means Phobos or the Mars surface), and 5) decision to 
continue with the destination exploration phase.  The mission 
phases associated with returning the crew to Earth typically 
do not contain key architectural decision gates, since safe 
return of the mission crew along the nominal path is typically 
the only option.  Figure 5 and Figure 7 show where decision 
gates associated with exploration of Phobos or the surface 
(gates four and five) are in the respective mission phases in 
the vicinity of Mars. 
 
Figure 8.  Landing and ascent maneuvers and times for 
various staging orbits. 
 
Table 2.  Key figures of merit for using Phobos as a 
staging location. 
 
So how would a mission to Phobos help reduce the risk for 
Mars surface missions or serve as a test or certification step?  
It doesn’t.  Both missions to Phobos and the surface of Mars 
must safely arrive in Mars orbit after successfully passing 
through risk decision gates 1-3.  Up to the point where the 
decision must be made to explore Phobos or Mars, they are 
the same and there is no distinction between them.  The 
decision to explore Phobos or the surface of Mars are made 
as separate and distinct risk decision gates and are not related.  
Thus, prior to the decision to proceed with the exploration of 
Phobos, a mission to Phobos would not in itself retire any 
risks that a mission to the surface of Mars would, up to the 
point of proceeding with the landing.  Proceeding to either 
Phobos or the surface of Mars introduces additional 
destination unique risks. 
Phobos Challenges as Compared to Mars Surface - 
Exploration of Phobos introduces unique challenges and risks 
which would not be present for Mars surface missions. 
• Zero-gravity Exposure:  Phobos missions will be 
conducted entirely in zero-gravity.  Durations for Mars 
missions typically range from 600 to over 1000 days.  
Thus, the amount of time in free space for Phobos 
missions is significant and will represent a major 
challenge for the human health community.  (For 
reference, Mars surface missions can result in up to 
300-500 days on the surface, resulting in 25%-56% less 
time in free space). 
• Radiation Exposure:  Measurements conducted on the 
surface of Mars obtained by the Radiation Assessment 
Detector instrument have provided a good estimate for 
the expected radiation dose that the crew will be 
exposed to. [31]  Studies on the effectiveness of 
different spacecraft materials on reducing the radiation 
dosage to the crew have indicated that while statistically 
significant improvements in protection from galactic 
cosmic radiation can be obtained with high 
hydrocarbon materials, shielding thickness beyond 20 
g/cm2 has limited effect on shielding performance. [32] 
In fact, the planet itself will provide the crew the best 
shielding due to the mass and atmosphere of Mars.  
Thus, for the Phobos or Mars surface exploration 
missions, crew radiation exposure will be reduced by 
spending more time exploring the planetary body and 
less time in free space.  Hence the desire to follow the 
“long duration habitation” strategy for exploring 
Phobos and the surface of Mars. 
• Transit to the Destination:  It is often claimed that 
Phobos missions are “less risky” than Mars surface 
missions because they avoid the tricky entry, descent, 
landing, and ascent phases.  However, as long as 
exploration of the surface of Mars remains a key 
strategic objective, the Mars landing and ascent phases 
cannot be avoided; a mission to Phobos only delays the 
eventual need to land on Mars.  Both missions to 
Phobos and Mars have unique challenges associated 
with getting to the exploration destination.  Phobos 
missions will require the incorporation of a dedicated 
Phobos crew-taxi which must support the crew for 
multiple days and perform the necessary translational 
maneuvers (on the order of two km/s).  Due to the low 
surface gravity of Phobos the arrival phase will be more 
analogous to “rendezvous” as opposed to “landing” on 
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the surface of Mars.  Phobos transfers are done via 
propulsive maneuvers in free space, whereas Mars 
surface access introduces additional challenges, 
including hypersonic and transonic entry phases, 
descent, and landing, followed by Mars ascent.  
Landing on Mars is much different than Phobos, thus a 
Phobos mission would not reduce the associated risks 
for Mars surface landing.  Surface landing risk is better 
mitigated using a series of dedicated crew-size cargo 
landers – essentially the forward deploy cargo missions. 
• Phobos-unique challenges:  Abercromby [14], 
Gernhardt [18] and Hopkins [13] describe many of the 
operational and system concepts necessary for 
exploring the very low gravity of Phobos.  Uncertainty 
in the surface composition combined with the low-
gravity environment will require the incorporation of 
Phobos-unique exploration concepts and systems.  
Analyses by Abercromby [14] show that escape 
velocities from the surface of Phobos are on the order 
of only 3 m/s, depending on the location.5  To operate 
on Phobos, unique systems such as jetpacks, booms, 
mobility legs, or anchoring systems, to name just a few, 
must be included in the operational concept.  Likewise, 
in this low gravity environment, care must be taken to 
minimize pluming or disturbing the surface, since 
disturbed surface dust will take a long time to settle 
back down, complicating the operations.  These 
Phobos-unique systems and operational concepts have 
little feed-forward to Mars surface missions, and thus 
will represent one-time Phobos-specific investments.   
The Cost and Schedule of Phobos Exploration 
Other often cited rationales for human exploration of Phobos 
are the purported cost-effectiveness, specifically from a 
budget-smoothing perspective, and the schedule relief of 
development of the Mars landers and associated surface 
exploration systems.  That is, a Phobos mission would 
provide a significant exploration achievement while “buying 
time” for development of the necessary Mars surface 
exploration systems.  As discussed previously, a human 
mission to Phobos will require the development and pre-
deployment of Phobos-unique systems including habitation, 
a crew taxi, science equipment, and anchoring and mobility 
methods.  These systems must be designed, developed, 
tested, launched, transported, and emplaced at the proper 
location prior to the crew leaving Earth orbit.  These, along 
with the required launch and mission support efforts, 
represent unique one-time costs. Even if these systems and 
procedures can potentially be derived from other required 
Mars exploration systems, their development will put 
additional pressure on the overall exploration budget.  Price, 
et al [17] describe an example integrated Mars architecture 
analysis conducted by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 2015.  
This architecture described one approach for a stepwise 
exploration methodology which included development and 
 
5 For reference, if you jump off Phobos with only half the speed of a typical 
high-jump here on Earth, you would escape into space.   
testing of the necessary operational systems, including 
International Space Station technology development and risk 
reduction, deep-space transportation system development 
and testing, robotic testing of Mars landers, and crew testing 
of prototype deep space habitation systems.  The resulting 
schedule milestones from the JPL study is reproduced in 
Figure 9.  Panel (a) provides the key campaign milestones, 
and panel (b), derived from panel (a), shows the resulting 
development and flight schedules needed to meet those key 
campaign events.  As can be seen from examination of this 
figure, development and testing of the required Phobos 
exploration systems (shown in gray), along with the actual 
mission execution, occurs in parallel with the critical Mars 
surface access and surface systems development.  
Development of these systems at the same time will place 
additional budget and execution pressure, either increasing 
the required budget or delaying the Mars surface missions, 
pushing them further to the right in time. 
 
Figure 9.  Example Mars campaign schedule. 
 
5. SUMMARY  
Human exploration of Mars has continued to maintain strong 
political and public interest support and should be used as the 
horizon destination to help focus research and systems 
development.  Human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit to 
the Moon, and eventually to the surface of Mars, should be 
accomplished through a series of sequential missions.  In 
order to be affordable and sustainable, each stage should 
strategically reduce risk and help develop fundamental 
capabilities and operational concepts for subsequent phases.  
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While a human mission to Phobos would be significant in the 
representation of the ability of humans to venture out farther 
in space than at any point in history, as discussed in the 
manuscript, a mission to Phobos should not be viewed as a 
validation of a round-trip mission to Mars orbit and back.  
Mars missions are very unforgiving with limited abort 
options, long duration, and limited logistics supply 
opportunities.  The risk profile for a human mission to Mars 
orbit and back is the same whether the intended exploration 
destination is Phobos or the surface of Mars.  Thus, a Phobos 
mission provides no further Mars orbit risk reduction 
benefits, yet it introduces additional Phobos-unique risks 
(i.e., very low gravity exploration) and new exploration 
systems such as a crew taxi, a Phobos-tailored habitat, 
reduced gravity mobility, and Phobos exploration gear.  The 
fixed circular orbit of Phobos does not serve as a good staging 
location for missions to the Mars surface.  Insertion of a 
Phobos mission before a mission to the surface of Mars will 
burden the overall required budget and delay the ultimate 
goal of getting to Mars. 
 
In his testimony in 1990 before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Dr. Franklin Martin, then Associate 
Administrator of NASA’s Office of Exploration, provided a 
concise summary of what was known regarding human 
missions to Phobos at the time: “Now, we could go to Phobos 
in a rather inexpensive way in terms of mass [in] low-Earth-
orbit to get there, because you don’t have to go down in to 
the gravitational field of Mars.  You don’t have to pay the 
price of landing on Mars in terms of mass and getting off the 
planet.  The gravitational field on Phobos is about a 1000th 
of what it is here in this room.  So, it is a relatively easy place 
to get to.  Phobos to go somewhere else, it’s a little limited. 
… But to me, going to Phobos without a commitment to go on 
to Mars is a little like taking your kids to Orlando and not 
taking them to Disney World.  Mars is Disney World… We 
need to analyze that and make sure we understand what’s 
going on.”[33]  Since Dr. Martin made this statement, 
analysis included in this paper and the cited references shows 
that Phobos is not easy, nor risk free, and not on the path to 
the surface of Mars.  If a mission to Phobos is considered 
further as a strategic destination for human exploration, it 
must stand on its own merits in terms of risk and return on 
investment, and not as a rationale for getting to Mars.  It must 
provide unique value on its own beyond the limited 
applicability to Mars surface missions.  In fact, a detour to 
Phobos will add cost and delay surface access with no clear 
reductions in risk to future Mars surface missions.  
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